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The process of economic development and growth is a process of an endless introduction of
new technologies. This is especially true for the early stages of the Industrial Revolution but
also applies today. When new technologies are introduced, their properties are not always
well understood. While a technology might promise that a certain good is provided very
e¢ ciently, the same technology could also have side e⁄ects that did not occur to the inventor.
The history of the introduction of new technologies is full of countless examples.
Since as early as the Roman Empire, coal has been used as a source of energy. Systematic
coal mining, however, was not carried out until the Industrial Revolution, when a massive
and steady supply of energy was required. Coal seemed like the perfect solution. Mining,
however, has its side e⁄ects. In 1831, a potential causal link between working in a coal mine
and black lung disease was ￿rst reported by a Scottish physician. Nowadays, black lung
disease is accepted as a disease caused by the repeated and year-long inhalation of small
amounts of coal dust. However, it took more than 130 years for this link to be generally
accepted. Only in the 1960s, after extensive political activities by various worker groups in
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia on the Appalachian coal ￿elds, was black lung disease
recognized as an occupational disease. As a consequence, the Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act was passed in 1969 which established more comprehensive rules for work conditions and
also the compensation of disabled mine workers (Smith, 1987).
There is an abundance of further examples of worker movements improving health and
safety conditions, including ￿brown lung￿disease caused by exposure to cotton dust (Botsch,
1993), ￿white lung￿disease caused, inter alia, by mining and the exposure to asbestos (Rosner
and Markovitz, 1991), the health risk posed by radium (Clark, 1997), workplace exposure to
dibromochloropropane, a pesticide that makes workers sterile and is linked to the risk of
cancer (Robinson, 1991), the spray machine con￿ ict in the early 1900s (Frounfelker, 2006)
or con￿ icts in the pottery industry (Stern, 2003) and in the automobile and steel industries
(Bacow, 1980, ch. 5). For an overview of the literature on the history of occupational health
and safety (OHS), see Judkins (1986, p. 240). A more general history of labor standards with
international comparisons is covered by Engerman (2003).
A reading of these analyses shows that the side e⁄ects caused by new ways of production
reveal themselves only gradually. While there might be uncertainty about health implications
of a certain job, there is initially often simply ignorance about health implications, sometimes
just absence of any doubt. When workers then start sensing that ￿something is going wrong￿ ,
that work conditions are causing health problems, these claims are often met with doubt, not
only by employers, but also by insurance companies or even the government. These analyses
also clearly demonstrate that worker movements, joint collective actions by individuals, are
required to raise political awareness, to lobby for changes in work conditions and to eventually
bring about regulatory changes towards better OHS measures.
Similar conclusions about the importance of worker movements for triggering broader
2support not only for the improvement of working conditions but also for the development
of the modern welfare state can be drawn when looking at Germany. During the Industrial
Revolution around 1850, the issues of poverty, working and living conditions of dependent
workers caused organizations to be created enabling workers to express their own interests (see
e.g. Schneider, 2005, p. 15). While poverty and dependent work also existed in pre-industrial
times, the contemporaneous rise of the wealthiness of some and the poverty of others was no
longer accepted as ￿the will of God￿ . The ￿rst trade union in Germany, founded in June 1848
by type setters, was set up with an aim to secure the living standards of type setters, who
feared competition from the steam engine and technological progress (hence, there was income
orientation), but also with an aim to establish mutual health and disability insurance systems
(Schneider, 2005, p. 27). The worker movement, represented by unions and political parties,
was also incited by occupational injuries which almost caused ￿mass causalities￿(Tennstedt
et al. 1993, p. XXI), partly due to the widespread use of new technologies and fast economic
growth. These movements and associated political pressure caused Bismarck, the German
chancellor, to implement, inter alia, statutory accident insurance in 1884.
The outcome of this discussion about historical episodes in advanced OECD countries is
threefold: (i) A safe workplace, in short OHS, does not come for free: Achievements of the
modern welfare state, which today are taken for granted, were hotly disputed in the past. (ii)
There is a con￿ ict of interest between unions and ￿rms, which goes beyond pure wage bill
issues. In many cases, industry, insurance companies and often also the government initially
object to any demands for compensation or changes in health standards simply because there
is no clear scienti￿c medical evidence for the claimed nexus between certain symptoms and
the professional activity. (iii) Unions2 played a crucial role in pushing for OHS standards
and prepared and fought for what is (almost generally) accepted today as a positive aspect of
modern welfare states (see e.g. Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1), Agell (1999, p. F144) and
the discussion below). Only once workers succeed in forming large groups and in lobbying for
their joint interests is there enough political visibility in order for changes in OHS regulations
to take place. To put it brie￿ y, in the spirit of Freeman and Medo⁄￿ s (1984) ￿collective voice￿ :
Trade unions have a ￿good face￿as well.
The purpose of this paper is to understand why it took worker movements (rather than
the government or employers) to start the development of insurance mechanisms. Why did
worker movements eventually lead to the creation of government agencies which regulate OHS
nowadays and what are the determinants of endogenous OHS standards?
We shall construct a model which highlights the key ingredients for understanding the
importance of worker movements in the past. Jobs have two e⁄ects on workers - they provide
income and they a⁄ect health. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we will
assume that workers are entirely ignorant about the health implications of jobs: job choice
2We will often use ￿ union￿as name for more informal worker groups, worker movements or worker associa-
tions. Union, as used here, does not necessarily describe a well-organized and at times bureaucratic institution
as is nowadays the case in some OECD countries.
3is based purely on the wage paid by the employer. Returning to the coal miner example
from above, workers were simply not aware of the potential risk of black lung disease.3 Given
the absence of any information on the health risk of working, the production process exerts
a negative externality on workers￿health. This translates into a pure health externality
a⁄ecting utility of workers and into an aggregate labour supply externality. OHS standards
can in principle reduce these externalities but they also reduce the total factor productivity
(TFP) of ￿rms, re￿ ecting the fact that OHS is costly.
We embed this view into an economy with one homogenous good and inelastic aggregate
labour supply (before taking the health externality into account). We assume perfect com-
petition on goods and labour markets, implying, inter alia, full employment. Unions do not
cause unemployment in our setup. Firms hire workers from a spot market. As countries
in early stages of development do hardly exhibit any speci￿c worker-￿rm attachments (like
long-term contracts or health insurance systems), ￿rms can simply replace a sick worker by
a healthy one.4
As long as health e⁄ects of working are disputed, no employer or government would con-
cede better working conditions. The role of worker movements is to provide and con￿rm
information about the health e⁄ects of working. An individual worker does not have enough
time and makes too few observations to discern job-related health e⁄ects from other health
e⁄ects. A group of workers, a union, has many members and thereby more observations.
Learning is much faster and unions can thereby help internalize the externality.
In standard trade union models, the objective of trade unions is to maximize the wage
income of their members. We extend this arguably narrow perspective and portray trade
unions as having both high wage income and good health standards as their objective. We
then ￿nd determinants of OHS standards by letting unions set OHS standards. This monopoly
view of OHS-setting unions and employment-setting ￿rms is - as in wage-setting models of
unions - a short-cut to a more complete setup with endogenous union membership where
workers form groups to increase the speed of learning.
Some of our ￿ndings are as follows: Each ￿rm individually is opposed to higher OHS
standards as they reduce TFP and thereby pro￿ts. Unlike compensating di⁄erentials setups
with complete information, competitive markets here are unable to take health e⁄ects caused
by technologies into account: individuals can not judge with su¢ ciently high precision to what
extent a certain job will a⁄ect the health. The laissez-faire factor allocation is characterized
3We see this complete ignorance as a short-cut to a Bayesian learning setup where workers form a prior
about health implications and it takes time to learn the true health consequences of a job. See Viscusi (1979,
1980) for various applications of Bayesian learning to uncertainty about health implications of jobs.
4In her account of the transformation of the US labour market in the twentieth century, Goldin (2000)
argues that labour markets never where ￿ spot markets￿as portrayed in theory. But she also writes that ￿such
labor markets had attributes far more characteristic of ￿spot￿markets than do labor markets today￿(p. 550).
We therefore believe that the assumption of a spot market (in the theory sense) is the best modeling choice
for real world markets at that time.
4by ine¢ ciently high sickness leaves. The externalities at work are a health externality and an
aggregate labour-supply externality. The former a⁄ects both healthy and thereby employed
workers and workers currently without job.
If better-informed ￿rm-level trade unions set OHS standards, the positive e⁄ect on the
improved health of their members balances the negative e⁄ect of lower employment due to
lower TFP. If there are economy-wide or occupational unions, OHS standards are more com-
prehensive as unions also take the negative health e⁄ect on overall labour supply into account.
Whether a union confederation succeeds in internalizing all externalities depends on member-
ship rules to be discussed further below. As both ￿rm-level unions and union confederations
internalize at least some of the health and labour-supply externality, the presence of unions
is output- and welfare-increasing.
The paper starts with a short review of the related literature. Section 3 presents the model.
Section 4 analyses the di⁄erence between the centralized and decentralized equilibrium. The
reason for suboptimal decentralized equilibrium is presented and it is shown why majority
voting would not resolve the issue. Section 5 argues that ￿rm-level trade unions move safety
measure towards their socially optimal levels and that union federations set close to welfare-
maximizing safety levels. Section 6 applies this framework to understand the dynamics of
trade union density from 1880 to 2008 for selected OECD countries. An emphasis is put
on cross-country di⁄erences in preferences - inspired by American Exceptionalism. The ￿nal
section concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to various strands of literature. First, there is obviously a huge literature
on trade unions, and it would be impossible to provide a summary here which does any justice
to the various substrands. While it seems fair to argue that most contributions attribute
a distorting (e¢ ciency-reducing) role to unions5, there are also some economists that ￿nd
positive aspects in union behaviour: Brugiavini et al. (2001, ch. II.2.1) see unions as the
precursor to the modern welfare state. They write on p. 163 that ￿unions developed mutual
insurance as part of associational self-help to compensate for the lack of private insurance or
public social protection. At the same time, they mobilized [...] for the expansion of social
rights. Increasingly, many of the protective functions that unions provided [...] came to be
taken over by the state￿ .6 A by now well-accepted argument was made by Freeman and Medo⁄
5Distortions can have their positive sides in second-best worlds or when it comes to collecting rents. See
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) for an example with an employment-oriented union in an international trade
setup with imperfect competition.
6Historical evidence linking union growth to their provision of insurance (strikes, unemployment, sickness,
burial cost) for the Netherlands and Britain is provided by van Leeuwen (1997). Quantitative evidence for
the United States for union decline due to an expanding welfare state is provided by Neumann and Rissman
(1984).
5(1984): By providing a ￿collective voice￿ , unions provide information which otherwise would
not be available. Malcomson (1983) argues that unions increase e¢ ciency as they improve
the allocation of risk-bearing between ￿rms and workers. Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that
unions induce training and provide insurance. Booth and Chatterji (1998) and Viscusi (1979,
ch. 11) show how trade union bargaining with monopsonistic ￿rms increases social welfare
and Agell (1999, p. F144), more generally, argues that ￿certain institutions may serve quite
useful purposes￿in the labour market. We put forward OHS standards as an example of such
a useful institution. We believe that this bene￿cial historical aspect of worker movements for
what are now modern societies and the role unions can play in developing countries today
has not received su¢ cient credit so far. Our contribution lies in the emphasis and analysis,
in the framework of a very simple model, of the informational and learning advantage of a
union in a world with incomplete information and side e⁄ects caused by new technologies.
Second, and maybe most importantly, our view of multi-feature workplaces is related to
but di⁄ers starkly from the equalizing di⁄erences approach of Rosen (1974, 1986). Equalizing
di⁄erences are traditionally derived in setups with perfect information. When workers know
about all job characteristics and all markets are competitive, factor allocation is e¢ cient
and any institution would be distorting. Given the historical situation and technological
examples we have in mind, workers having perfect information does not appear to be a realistic
assumption. We therefore choose the other extreme and assume that workers are unable
to learn anything about work-related health implications. While the reality certainly lies
somewhere in between, the justi￿cation for our assumption is simple: When new technologies
become available, workers and often society as a whole do not know a lot about potential
side e⁄ects. Health implications may only become apparent over the long-term and workers
might simply not have the time to learn about these implications. Hence, with regard to
learning processes which take a very long time, we assume right away that it is impossible
for the individual workers to learn of health e⁄ects. As a consequence, a decentralized factor
allocation is ine¢ cient. In contrast, trade unions consisting of a large number of workers
have access to many observations about jobs, can collect this information and can therefore
learn more easily. In fact, we assume that unions have perfect information and can therefore
internalize externalities, increase e¢ ciency, output and welfare.
A companion paper (Donado and W￿lde, 2010a) qualitatively and quantitatively studies
the e⁄ect of globalization for labour standards in the North and in the South in the presence
of unions as portrayed here.
3 The model
Our economy produces a homogenous good. Aggregate output amounts to Y . A typical ￿rm
produces the quantity y by employing a certain number of workers l. All ￿rms use the same
6technology with total factor productivity (TFP) A(s);
y = A(s)f (l): (1)
The function f (l) is characterized by positive but decreasing marginal productivity, f0 > 0
and f00 < 0: This amounts to saying that y has constant returns to scale as there is some other
factor of production (capital, human capital of an entrepreneur or other) which is normalized
to one.7 Given our historical perspective on what are now OECD countries or our focus on
developing countries today, we assume that ￿rms can hire from a spot market. There are no
hiring or ￿ring costs and it does not take any time to ￿nd a worker.
The central focus of this paper is OHS. This aspect is re￿ ected in the production process
in the TFP component A(s). TFP in a ￿rm or in a country is in￿ uenced by many factors,
starting from very technology-speci￿c aspects (like the management and communication skills
of sta⁄) and ranging to more economy-wide in￿ uences (like the institutional stability, the
political regime, or the education level of workers). The more important factor in￿ uencing
TFP for our arguments is OHS s. A job is safe(r) if a worker is (more) certain to return home
in good health after 8 (or more) hours of work. We re￿ ect safer jobs by a higher s > 0:
Safe workplaces are clearly in the interest of the worker, and in many cases, OHS is also
a central concern for employers. If safety measures increase the smoothness of a production
process, employers should be in favour of high safety standards. An accident in a coal mine,
costing not only lives of workers but also letting the production process break down for weeks,
is clearly not in the interest of the ￿rm. In many cases, however, there is a fundamental con￿ ict
of interest. In the case of low-skill workers or workers needing only general (i.e. not ￿rm-
speci￿c) human capital to perform their job and in countries where ￿rms do not (have to) pay
sickness-leave (i.e. whenever ￿rms can easily replace their workers), ￿rms have no economic
interest in the state of health of their workers. Quite to the contrary, OHS measures are
costly. A workplace where coal miners are well protected against black lung disease or ore
miners against silicosis is more costly than one without protection measures like ventilation
systems. A worker who spends half an hour dressing and undressing (helmets, safety glasses,
gloves, entire suits etc.) is less productive than a worker who starts doing his job right away.
What matters for our results is that workers value safety more than ￿rms. For modelling
purposes, we go to the extreme and exclude ￿rms from any bene￿ts from higher safety. We
capture safety costs by letting OHS measures reduce TFP, A0 (s) < 0.8 Given the spot market
assumption, a sick worker would simply be replaced by a new healthy worker.
7This follows the tradition in this literature (see e.g. McDonald and Solow, 1981, Oswald, 1982 or Booth,
1995). For an analysis with explicit constant returns to scale and capital as the second factor of production,
see the discussion paper version of this paper (Donado and W￿lde, 2010b).
8This is the standard assumption in the literature on compensating di⁄erentials, see e.g. Rosen (1986). If
A increased in s; no uncertain jobs would ever be observed. One can always imagine that A initially increases
in s but decreases above some threshold level. It could be that low s reduces labour productivity rather than
TFP. For simplicity, we will continue to use the term TFP.
7An individual values consumption c and health z and both are determined by the job an
individual chooses. A job is therefore a di⁄erentiated good as in Rosen (1974). Let z (s)
denote the share of days that an individual is healthy and can work. Currie and Madrian
(1999) summarize the literature on health and labour markets. They document a positive
relationship between health and income with health having a larger e⁄ect on hours than on
wages. While it is true that the link between health and labour market participation is less
clear-cut (Currie and Madrian stress that this could be due to an abundance of methodological
problems), in the following we feel safe to assume that safety measures s improve health,
z (s) > 0. Utility of workers,
u = u(c;z (s)); (2)
increases in consumption c and health z (s) per se, i.e. individuals value the share of days they
are healthy, but with a decreasing slope, uc > 0, ucc < 0 and uz > 0, uzz < 0 (subscripts denote
partial derivatives). Health is important for two reasons: It matters per se and consumption
rises due to more working days per year. All workers are identical in their preferences.
On the aggregate level, consumption equals output C = Y and labour demand L equals
labour supply,
L = z (s)N: (3)
The latter is given by potential employment N (a headcount assumed to be ￿xed) multiplied
by the share z (s) of, say, days a worker is healthy and can actually work. In equilibrium, this
amounts to L workers being healthy and working and N ￿ L workers being sick. Improved
safety, implying improved health, implies higher labour supply.
We ￿nally turn to trade unions. Depending on the degree of centralization of negotiations
and wage setting, the literature usually classi￿es countries in three groups (see e.g. Calmfors
and Dri¢ ll, 1988): (1) highly decentralized systems with wage setting at the ￿rm level (i.e.
USA and Canada), (2) intermediate degree of centralization (most continental European
countries), and (3) highly centralized systems with wage setting at the national level (i.e.
Nordic countries and Austria). We will also consider di⁄erent degrees of centralization and
model the two polar cases of highly decentralized and highly centralized systems.
In a decentralized setup, unions operate at the ￿rm level and are therefore small in com-
parison to the economy as a whole. As we view spot markets as the best description of labour
markets for activities as described in the introduction, there is no attachment of workers to
the ￿rm. Hence, membership of ￿rm-level unions is just as volatile as employment at the
￿rm. As a consequence, the union only cares about the overall well-being of the l workers in
this particular ￿rm. As households value consumption and health, we let unions value these
quantities as well. In fact, we make the union utilitarian and obtain, given (2), lu(c;z (s)):
8Given that employed workers earn full income, their consumption equals the wage,9
v = lu(w;z (s)): (4)
In some countries, unions are large or form a confederation. Their basic objectives are the
same but they now represent not only the workers of a particular ￿rm but all workers that
are currently employed,
V = Lu(w;z (s)): (5)
The main di⁄erence compared to the ￿rm-level union is that health now has two positive
channels, as in individual preferences (2): health matters per se and through higher labour
supply visible here through L. An alternative to economy-wide unions, also captured by
(5), are occupation-speci￿c unions. As long as a union takes the e⁄ect of standards on all
workers into account (e.g. because a union represents all coal miners and not just those
currently employed in one particular ￿rm), bene￿cial labour supply e⁄ects as a result of
higher standards are internalized by the union.
Both the small union and the confederation have a narrow membership concept. As only
those that work in a ￿rm are members of the union, workers that are sick are not taken into
account. This is the di⁄erence between unions and a central planner which will play a role
when discussing the welfare e⁄ects of unions.
4 Centralized and decentralized OHS setting
This section compares the behaviour of a planner to the setting of OHS levels in a decentralized
economy. This allows us to understand the basic mechanism of why trade unions in principle
can have positive welfare and output e⁄ects.
4.1 The decentralized economy
The standard view to a setup with multiple job characteristics is Rosen￿ s (1974, 1986)
equalizing-di⁄erences approach. According to this approach, workers enjoy (or dislike) job
characteristics in addition to the wage and a worker￿ s utility function would look like the one
we use in (2). The di⁄erence to our approach consists in the criteria for choosing a job. In the
equalizing-di⁄erences approach, workers have full information about job characteristics and
the choice of jobs would depend both on health implications z (s) and on income leading to a
consumption level c: Firms can therefore choose wage-safety pairs on a worker￿ s indi⁄erence
curve. The resulting market equilibrium would be e¢ cient.
9For an introduction to the discussion on the appropriate speci￿cation of union preferences, see Oswald
(1982) and Booth (1995, ch. 4). Note that even for modern Britain, there is evidence that physical working
conditions is one important issue over which trade unions and management bargain (Millward et al., 1992,
pp. 249-254).
9The crucial di⁄erence from our approach lies in our historical perspective of unions in
contemporary OECD countries and the conclusions we draw about information. Workers
do not have su¢ cient information (neither would society as a whole) to perfectly evaluate
the impact of work, a certain job or a speci￿c technology on health. Workers could form
expectations but their expectations need to be - in the absence of perfect information - based
on a prior in a Bayesian learning sense. Perfectly competitive ￿rms taking a safety-wage
trade-o⁄ into account would then set an ine¢ cient safety level if the prior is not identical to
the true distribution of the health impact of a job. When on the job, workers would of course
gradually learn about health implications of work, but each single worker makes just a few
observations, especially when health also depends on other factors than just work and certain
health impacts come with a long delay or can not easily be observed (as the examples in the
introduction have shown). There is simply not enough variation; econometrically speaking,
there is not a su¢ ciently large number of observations to draw ￿rm conclusions and learning
can take more than a lifetime. To capture this idea in the simplest way possible, we assume
here that workers choose employment based only on the wage and ￿rms choose employment
taking the wage rate as given.10 This will qualitatively imply the same type of ine¢ ciency one
would observe in a Bayesian setup (as employed e.g. by Viscusi, 1979, 1980). The advantage
of this shortcut is clearly the much simpler analytical tractability.11
Given this focus of workers on wages, optimal ￿rm behaviour yields the familiar equality
between marginal productivities and factor rewards,
w = A(s)f
0 (l): (6)
In a laissez-faire economy, a ￿rm ￿xes the stock of labour and the safety level s: The derivative
of pro￿ts with respect to the safety level is d￿=ds = A0 (s); i.e. it is negative. Firms only
see the TFP-reducing impact of increased safety. As a consequence, ￿rms would like OHS
standards to be as low as possible. The comparison point to the central planner solution sU
or sY, to be characterised shortly, is a laissez-faire safety level of s￿: Given that we exclude
negative safety levels, we can set s￿ to zero (or to the level where A(s) starts to fall, see
fn. 8).
4.2 The planner
The planner can take two guises. Either the planner maximizes aggregate output, or welfare.
As all ￿rms use the same technologies, aggregate output is obtained by replacing labour input
10An alternative way to describe this is to let workers maximize utility (2) considering z (s) as exogenous
and identical for all. We would like to thank a referee for pointing this out.
11Fishback (1998) argues that some compensating di⁄erentials seem to have been paid in the US around the
beginning of the 20th century, but the ￿di⁄erentials rarely fully covered the expected losses￿(p. 723). Our
assumption of an absence of compensating di⁄erentials therefore appears to be a su¢ ciently good description
of labour markets in earlier stages of development.
10in individual output (1) by the labour-market equilibrium condition (3),12
Y (s) = A(s)f (z (s)N): (7)
A utilitarian welfare function takes into account that a worker can be in two states. When
healthy and employed, utility is given by u(w(s);z (s)); where consumption in (2) was re-
placed by wage income. Denoting the latter by w(s); we stress the dependence of the wage
on safety levels s: When the worker is unable to work and labour market income equals zero,
utility is given by u(0;z (s)).13 Social welfare is therefore de￿ned by
U (s) = Lu(w(s);z (s)) + (N ￿ L)u(0;z (s)): (8)
We see immediately from this structure that the safety level sU chosen by the planer will
generally di⁄er from the one by a large union (5) as the latter ignores workers that are not
employed. Whether this di⁄erence is of a technical nature or real depends on the determi-
nants of union membership. Whether workers remain members of a union once they become
temporarily or permanently unable to work depends on various institutional details that di⁄er
across countries and over time. We will return to this issue when we discuss our results.
If the planner focuses only on output maximization, the optimality condition giving the
output-maximizing safety level sY can directly be seen from the aggregate production function
(7),
A
0 (s)f (z (s)N) + Af
0 (z (s)N)z
0 (s)N = 0: (9)
This condition balances the output-decreasing e⁄ect due to lower TFP, the ￿rst term, with the
output-increasing e⁄ect due to more labour supply, the second term. Whether there is in fact
an interior solution or not will depend on the functional forms of z (s) and A(s): Introducing
some type of Inada conditions for z (s) and A(s) at s = 0 and s = 1, respectively, and letting
the functions in (9) be su¢ ciently smooth would make sure that an interior solution actually
exists. Conditions in this vein would imply that the left-hand side of (9) is positive for s = 0
and negative for s = 1:14
A social planner maximizing welfare (8) will take the e⁄ect of the OHS level s on labour
supply as in (3) into account. The wage rate is the competitive one from (6). Given that z (s)
12It is well-known that this is not a completely innocuous aggregation. As labour is characterized by
decreasing mariginal productivity, output of the economy increases in the number of ￿rms. We circumvent
this problem by normalizing the measure of ￿rms to one. As is also easy to understand, none of our results
depends on this normalization.
13One might want to argue that the inability to work implies that health should be smaller than z (s): This
could easily be achieved by multiplying z (s) by a factor smaller than one. As this would not a⁄ect any of our
results, however, we omit this factor.
14Providing examples for functional forms (e.g. of the Cobb-Douglas or CES type) that yield an interior
solution is straightforward (Donado and W￿lde, 2010b).
11denotes the share of days that an individual is healthy and can work and her average health
level, the per-capita welfare function reads
U (s)=N = z(s)u(w(s);z (s)) + [1 ￿ z(s)]u(0;z (s)): (10)
Simplifying notation by u(w(s);z (s)) ￿ u and u(0;z (s)) ￿ ￿ u; the socially optimal safety
level sU is described by
z
0(s)[u ￿ ￿ u] + z(s)[uww
0 (s) + uzz
0 (s)] + [1 ￿ z(s)] ￿ uzz
0 (s) = 0: (11)
Condition (11) balances the welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing e⁄ects of increased
safety. The ￿rst term displays an increase in welfare as the share of healthy workers increases
and as utility of healthy workers exceeds utility of sick workers, u > ￿ u. The second term shows
how employed workers lose as their wage falls and how they gain as they value health per
se. The third term displays a gain again, re￿ ecting the fact that sick workers also value more
health. The only downside of higher OHS, the reduction of wages, stems from two sources.
Recall that aggregate labour supply, as employed also in the aggregate production function
(7), is given by z (s)N. Hence, the wage can from (6) be written as w(s) = A(s)f0 (z (s)N).
The ￿rst source of a wage drop due to higher safety is the drop in TFP. Second, more safety
increases the labour supply at the aggregate level (since more workers are healthy), which in
turn reduces marginal productivity.
Compared to the utility maximizing condition (11), the output maximizer misses two
channels: While the negative e⁄ect through falling TFP and the positive e⁄ect through higher
labour supply are taken into account, the direct e⁄ects on health, both of the employed and
unemployed workers, is missing. One would therefore expect that the welfare maximizing
health level is higher than the output maximizing level, sU > sY.
Compared to the decentralized equilibrium, we see that there are two externalities at
work here. First, the health externality stemming from the fact that workers value health
per se. This externality a⁄ects both healthy workers being currently employed and sick
workers. Second, there is a labour supply externality caused by an increase of aggregate labour
supply if workers become more healthy. The health externality operates within ￿rms and can
potentially be internalized by ￿rm-level unions. The labour supply externality operating
across ￿rms can only be internalised at the country level. We will see now to which extent a
government is able to internalise these two externalities and further below what role unions
can play.
4.3 The role of the government
Occupational health and safety standards in OECD countries are nowadays set by government
agencies. Viewing these agencies as the outcome of some political aggregation of preferences,
could one not argue that unions are not needed and a voting mechanism would be su¢ cient for
12achieving socially desirable OHS levels? We will brie￿ y inquire into this issue by presenting
a standard median voter model. We will see that voting by uninformed workers yields a
suboptimal OHS level.
A policy maker that seeks to maximize the number of votes commits to a safety level that
corresponds to the safety level preferred by the median voter. The median voter can be seen
either as an expected utility maximizer or as an individual that spends a certain share of
his or her time as working and being healthy and the remaining share as being sick. In a
full-information equilibrium, utility of individual i would be given by
ui = z (s)u(w(s);z (s)) + (1 ￿ z (s))u(0;z (s)): (12)
In this type of equilibrium, voters are aware of the fact that OHS levels a⁄ect both the wage
level and the share of time he or she can work. Formally, the voter is aware that z = z (s):
As the structure of (12) is identical to the per-capita social welfare function (10), this yields a
preferred safety level identical to the one chosen by the planer in (11). As all individuals are
the same, voting under full information would imply that the socially desired safety level sU
is implemented. The one central shortcoming of this approach, just as with the compensating
di⁄erentials view, is the assumption of full information.
Under the empirically more convincing assumption of imperfect information and the ne-
cessity for learning, individuals are not aware of the safety s to health z link. Individuals
perceive health to be a function of nature, nurture or individual habits but not necessarily
as the true relationship z (s): Hence, an individual voter, not sharing information with other
voters who have experience about potential work-health links, would maximize
ui = zu(w(s);z) + (1 ￿ z)u(0;z):
Individual health z is perceived to be unrelated to OHS levels and only the e⁄ect of OHS levels
on the wage is taken into account. A voting equilibrium would imply that a suboptimally low
safety level would be set by the policy maker. In fact, one would expect a safety level s￿ as
in the suboptimal decentralized equilibrium.
Summarizing, a government setting OHS levels via a voting scheme can do so successfully
only if voters are fully informed. As historical examples show, this full information is not a
convincing assumption. Voting would therefore aggregate individual choices, but these choices
are still biased as long as information is not available. An exchange of information is needed
and we will now see how this can be achieved through unions.
5 Endogenous OHS with trade unions
The previous section showed that both a laissez-faire equilibrium and a voting mechanism
do not internalize any of the externalities. We will now show that trade unions reduce or
13even eliminate the distorting e⁄ect. Why does the union have the knowledge and means
required to do so? There are two reasons: First, unions have many members and the more
members there are, the easier it is to learn about job characteristics beyond the wage. Due to
its size, the union can collect information more easily than individuals. Second, in contrast
to a loose group of workers that have no institutional connection, unions have the means to
￿prove￿the link between bad work conditions and health. They can monitor the credibility of
individual claims about work conditions more easily15 and they also have the power to impose
better working conditions. Unions are a means to overcome the information and credibility
problem of individual workers (see, for example, Fenn and Ashby (2004, p. 46) and Robinson
(1991, pp. 41-7).16 In what follows, we will analyse the principles of optimal union behaviour
both for a decentralized system (￿rm-level unions) and a centralized system (trade union
confederation).
5.1 Firm-level unions
In the traditional monopoly union model (see Dunlop, 1944, Oswald, 1982), unions set the
wage, ￿rms choose employment and unemployment is the ine¢ cient equilibrium outcome.
We give unions market power as well, assuming that it is bene￿cial for workers to join a
union, that unions succeed in learning about the work-health link better than workers and
that unions succeed in solving the monitoring problem.17 This is our highly condensed version
of historical processes: Historically, worker movements do not have any market power when
they start. Political parties are often the vehicle through which public attention and support
increase. If new regulations then improve OHS standards, they are put into force by the
government. Indirectly, however, these new regulations are set by worker movements and
this is what we capture here. Unions use their market power not to set wages - as in the
traditional model - but to set the safety level s. While unions in the real world are concerned
with several issues of which wage negotiation is an important one, we focus here entirely on
union activities related to improving work conditions as described in the introduction. Wages
are perfectly ￿ exible in our setup and there is no unemployment.
At the ￿rm level, employment l in the union￿ s objective function (4) is given by the ￿rm￿ s
15The importance of unions in alleviating moral hazard problems has already been stressed by Beveridge
in 1909 (quote taken from van Leeuwen, 1997, p. 786). Beveridge claims that unions of his time were in the
best position to monitor the appropriate use of unemployment bene￿t payments.
16Firms can also learn faster than individual workers as a ￿rm hires many workers. Once the ￿rm has
learned about negative health e⁄ects of a certain technology, however, it might not be in the ￿rm￿ s interest to
reveal this information as workers with health problems that were incurred in the past could then ￿le claims.
17Giving unions market power allows us to use the elegant monopoly union setup. This should not suggest,
however, that we make a second-best world argument where one distortion (the market power of unions)
corrects for another distortion (imperfect knowledge). Unions are bene￿cial even without (or despite) market
power as they provide a superior (collective) learning technology in comparison to individualistic learning.
Future work could use a Bayesian learning setup where collective information collection alone improves welfare.
14labour demand from (6) which, through TFP, is a function of the safety level, l = l(A(s)).
The aggregate wage rate w in the labour demand function l(:) is taken as parametric by the
￿rm-level union. The choice of the safety level sv is perceived by the union to a⁄ect labour
demand through TFP and health z (s). We can therefore describe the union￿ s objective by
v (s) = l(A(s))u(w;z (s)): Assuming an interior solution, the union￿ s optimal OHS level sv
is given by
lAA
0 (s)u(w;z (s)) + luzz
0 (s) = 0: (13)
As in the planner￿ s trade-o⁄, safety has a positive as well as a negative e⁄ect. The negative
e⁄ect captured by the ￿rst term comes from the reduction of labour demand by the ￿rm as
a result of the cost associated with a higher level of safety. The positive e⁄ect, shown by the
second term, is the direct e⁄ect of improved health on utility of workers in this ￿rm.
The di⁄erences between the union￿ s optimal sv from (13) and the planner￿ s sU from (11)
stem from three sources: The ￿rm-level union does not take the e⁄ect on workers not working
in this particular ￿rm into account. This is why the term z0 (s)[u ￿ ￿ u] in (11) is missing
here. It does also neglect workers which are currently unable to work, i.e. [1 ￿ z] ￿ uzz0 (s) is
missing. Finally, the detrimental e⁄ect of OHS levels is evaluated with respect to labour
demand by this ￿rm and not with respect to the equilibrium wage level. The ￿rm-level union
does, however, internalize the health externality for healthy workers. In this sense, it improves
upon the decentralized equilibrium.
The ￿rm-level union could internalize the entire health externality, i.e. also for sick workers,
if workers remained members of the union also after having been replaced. Whether this will
be so depends essentially on membership details of unions. If membership extends beyond the
period where a worker is hired by a ￿rm, a union could take well-being of former employed
workers currently sick into account as well. If union membership ends at the moment of
the end of occupation (as portrayed above), the union would not represent the interests of
workers o⁄ the job. In the latter case, ￿rm-level unions would not be able to internalize all
health externalities. As a ￿rm-level union is small, it could in any case never internalize the
aggregate labour supply externality.
5.2 The trade union confederation
The union confederation has the same objectives as the ￿rm-level union only that it rep-
resents not only the workers from a particular ￿rm but the whole labour force. Conse-
quently, employment in the union confederation￿ s objective function (5) is economy-wide
labour supply L = z (s)N and the wage rate from (6) is the general equilibrium wage level,
w = w(A(s);z (s)N): The safety level set by the confederation is denoted by sV. Writing
the per-capita objective function as V=N = z (s)u(w(s);z (s)), the optimality condition is
z
0 (s)u + z (s)[uww
0 (s) + uzz
0 (s)] = 0: (14)
15The optimality condition (14) features two positive e⁄ects of higher safety, the increase in the
share of healthy workers, z0 (s), and the increase in utility due to higher safety and thereby
higher health. Losses result from the lower wage. As discussed after the optimality condition
of the welfare planner in (11), these losses are due to a reduction in TFP and an increase in
aggregate labour supply.
The two terms missing in (14) relative to the welfare planner condition (11) refer to workers
currently sick. As the union confederation cares about workers only, the e⁄ect of higher safety
levels is overestimated as the marginal health e⁄ect z0 (s) is multiplied by u in (14), in contrast
to [u ￿ ￿ u]z0 (s) in (11). By contrast, as the union confederation does not take the bene￿cial
health e⁄ects for those being currently without job into account, the [1 ￿ z] ￿ uzz0 (s) term in
(11), the e⁄ect of higher safety is underestimated. Overall, it is therefore not clear without
speci￿c functional forms and parameter values, which e⁄ect will dominate.
It is obvious from this discussion that a union confederation does internalize the health
externality for healthy workers and the labour supply externality. Just as the ￿rm-level union,
it does not internalize the health externality for sick workers as long as the latter do not remain
union members. If a union confederation took the interest of sick workers into account as well,
no market intervention of a planner is needed as the union confederation would internalize all
externalities.18
6 The rise and fall of trade unions across nations
Measures of union membership (either headcounts or densities) seem to suggest that there is
an inverse U-shape observable for basically all OECD countries. After an initial rise at the
end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, measures of trade union size
tend to decrease. While there is heterogeneity across countries, this seems to be the overall
pattern.
This section ￿rst presents an impression of this overall pattern. It then uses our framework
to provide an interpretation to the general time-series pattern. Finally, by adding some aspects
related to ￿ American Exceptionalism￿ , it tries to account for cross-country di⁄erences in this
general pattern.
6.1 The big picture
Figure 1 provides an impression of union densities for a selection of OECD countries. Density
is de￿ned as union membership divided by employment. The historical data for Australia,
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom come from Bain and
Price (1980), the historical US data is from Freeman (1998), data for Austria, France, Italy
18Normalizing utility when sick to zero, u(0;z (s)) = 0; would make the union confederation social welfare
maximizing. But this would be more of a technical solution assuming away the issue of membership.
16and the Netherlands come from Visser (1989). Data as of 1960 is from OECD (2011).19
While the historical data needs to be considered with care (see Visser, 1989, the appendix of
Freeman, 1994 and Bain and Price, 1980 for discussions of data quality), the inverted U-shape
is clearly visible.
The ￿gure displays predictions of union densities based on a regression of densities on time,
time-squared and a post 1959 dummy to capture the switch to OECD data. All coe¢ cients
are highly signi￿cant and R2s are high. The ￿gure reveals three features of union density
across countries: First, the inverted U-shape seems universal. Second, the peak di⁄ers across
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Figure 1 The inverted-U shape of trade union density from 1880 to 2008 in selected OECD
countries
19Whenever there is both data from the OECD and data from older sources, the more recent OECD source
was used. Density in Visser (1989) is provided on a net and gross basis. We chose the series which provided
more historical information. The basic time-series properties are not a⁄ected by this admittedly opportunistic
choice.
20These are not some artefacts of our estimation. This is also visible from the raw data. The data plus the
STATA codes are available at www.waelde.com/UnionDensity.
176.2 The rise and fall and American Exceptionalism
How can our framework help to understand these patterns? Let us ￿rst focus on the inverted-
U shape by, say, considering only one speci￿c country. The Industrial Revolution amounts to
a sequence of introductions of new technologies. These technologies initially have unknown
e⁄ects on health. Individuals learn about health e⁄ects over time and form groups in order
to share information. With an expanding industrial sector and an introduction of new tech-
nologies, a lot of learning about side-e⁄ects of technologies is required. As we argue above,
collective action is important and unions emerge.
To capture union density, one can easily imagine a generalisation of our model where
union members and non-union members would coexist. This would happen if (i) only union
members experience higher safety levels and (ii) there is heterogeneity in individual costs in
joining a union.21 These costs can be thought of as psychic costs arising from di⁄erences
in attitudes towards joining groups. With higher safety levels yielding higher utility, only
those individuals would join a union - ceteris paribus - whose preference of individualism is
below some threshold level. Given such a coexistence of union and non-union members, a
series of new technologies being introduced as a consequence (or characterizing) the Industrial
Revolution implies a rise of unions over time.22
If learning is successful over time and safety standards are being adopted by the govern-
ment (see e.g. Neumann and Rissman, 1984, for empirical support for the US), the importance
of unions declines.23 If the technologies that have been introduced in recent decades are less
risky (given that health investigations are much tighter today than in the past), a continuing
introduction of technologies does not require a continuing increase of union activity. Suc-
cessful collection of information convincing the public of the necessity of better standards is
the beginning of the end of unions. Success abolishes the very reason for the existence of
safety-setting unions. The necessity of collective action in the ￿rst place and the adoption of
union activities by government agencies as a consequence explains the inverted U-shape.
21Such a model would be in accordance with existing theories (see Checchi and Lucifora, 2002, for a short
but highly informative overview) where union membership is plagued by a free-rider problem if coverage by
union wages is 100%. This problem is solved either by positive reputation e⁄ects for, or provision of private
goods to, union members. Here, there is no free-rider problem as the positive e⁄ect of joining the union is
higher individual safety and the negative e⁄ect is the cost of joining.
22This does not discard other explanations for union growth as put forth e.g. by Freeman (1998), Checchi
and Lucifora (2002) and many others. Both our bene￿ts and our costs would be complementary to more
standard determinants like institutional factors, business cycle states or composition of the labour force of
the economy.
23Another reason for declining importance of unions could be the fact that ￿rm attachement of workers
becomes more long-term - as it did according to Goldin (2002). When workers have ￿rm-speci￿c skills and can
not easily be replaced, ￿rms have a stronger incentive to provide better safety standards. Taking both views
into account would require a model that allows a transition from spot markets to more stable worker-￿rm
relationships. For a short overview on deunionization, see e.g. Acemoglu et al (2001) or Checchi and Lucifora
(2002).
18Let us now turn to cross-country di⁄erences in the U-shape such as level and year of the
peak. Individual psychic costs for joining unions are crucial for understanding these di⁄erences
and this is where American Exceptionalism (AE) comes into play: The origin of AE can be
attributed to a statement in 1630 by John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, stressing the exceptional circumstances American settlers ￿nd themselves in (Ferrie,
2005). An overview of the discussion about AE is provided by Voss (1993). According to
her, AE manifests in the fact that workers in the US ￿were unable to build either a lasting
broad-based labor movement or a powerful socialist party￿ (p.2). In this vein, Friedman
(2010) relates AE to the fact that the US at some point was ￿the only country with no
labor movement￿ and ￿the ￿rst country with declining union density￿ .24 In other words,
the ￿American soul￿is opposed to public institutions (Lucore, 1989) and even to collective
arrangements as this restricts individuals ￿in shaping their own lives￿(Ferrie, 2005, p. 199).
We now condense American Exceptionalism for a union-nonunion membership model into
one single parameter, high psychic costs in joining a union. Costs are high in the US, compared
to other countries, as unions resemble public institutions and restrict individual freedom. In
other words, the US is a more individualistic society than many other societies.25 It is then
a straightforward implication that the US had such a low and early peak. Generalizing this
view to other countries would then imply that - ceteris paribus - the ranking of these countries
concerning the date and the level of peaks of union membership densities can be linked to
the distribution of costs of joining a group. Going from union membership to government
regulation, more individualistic countries should also be characterized by less severe and less
widespread regulations than countries with less individualism.
Summarizing, assuming that the health e⁄ects of the Industrial Revolution are the same
around the world, union density would grow faster and to a higher peak in a country where
the average preference for individualism is lower. American Exceptionalism explains the slow
rise and slow peak of union density in the US. It should also imply that the general amount
of regulations is smaller than in other countries.
24Freeman (1994) inquires into the existence of ￿universal￿e⁄ects of unions, i.e. e⁄ects a union has in any
country. Freeman argues that AE can be found in the unions￿e⁄ect on wages as the union-nonunion wage
gaps is the largest for the US. Another good example for AE is the fact that union coverage almost everywhere
exceeds union density, but hardly so in the US (OECD, 2004, chart 3.4).
25Various data sources o⁄er information on attitudes or personal characteristics. Examples include the
Hofstede index (Hofestede 2001, 2010) of individualism vs collectivism, various indices from personality psy-
chology like the ￿Big 5￿(Schmitt et al., 2007) and the World Values Survey. The latter was fruitfully exploited
by Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) in their analysis of the di⁄erences in attitudes between the US and
Europe. See also Schnabel and Wagner (2007) for an analysis of the impact of attitudinal variables on union
membership.
197 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper was the belief that institutions like trade unions, which have
been around for more than a century and are active in almost all countries in the world, are
not just detrimental to economic production and welfare of a society. Studying activities of
workers￿associations and trade unions beyond wage negotiation has shown that trade unions
play a major role in providing workplace safety - at least in providing information about the
necessity of measures that assure occupational health and safety (OHS). Trade unions did
perform this role historically in what are now OECD countries and do play such a role today
in certain industrializing economies.
Can these OHS activities of unions assign unions an output and welfare increasing role?
The crucial shortcoming of decentralized economies with health externalities from hazardous
jobs is the lack of information about health e⁄ects. This lack results from the fact that an
individual is generally not able to distinguish between various causes of good or bad health.
An individual worker therefore does not have su¢ ciently many independent observations
during his work-life to infer the e⁄ect of a job on health. This poses the question who is
in a position to collect the information needed to understand health e⁄ects of working in a
systematic way.
Inspired by many historical examples, where in early stages of development of an industry
worker movements raised awareness about negative health implications of various new tech-
nologies, this paper argues that it takes a group of workers - called a trade union for simplicity
- to collect this information. Worker movements that share a common goal exchange infor-
mation, i.e. they ￿collect data￿that allows then and them to identify health implications of
a job.
In a world without exchange of information, a government would be unable to perform this
job. A government seen as an executive body for an aggregate opinion obtained e.g. through
majority voting would fail in implementing the appropriate safety measures. Individual voters
in the absence of exchange of information would be misinformed and vote for a suboptimal
level of safety measures. In this sense, this paper provides a rationale for unions based
on their ability to collect information and derive conclusions about which type of jobs or
technologies have negative health implications and which do not. A large union is able to
internalize (at least partly) the direct health externality on workers and the aggregate labour
supply externality. This is output increasing and welfare improving. If workers currently not
working are re￿ ected in the union￿ s objective function, a union could even achieve the social
optimum.
The question arises why these activities are mainly performed by government agencies in
developed countries today. In our view, society as a whole has internalized the importance
of understanding all aspects of new technologies. Early worker movements were not only
successful in convincing companies and governments about health implications of, then, new
technologies. The entire process also led to an understanding that a government should
20have o¢ ces that systematically inquire into the health e⁄ects of new technologies. Putting
this to the extreme, the success of trade unions made them redundant in modern societies
where governments are su¢ ciently insightful into this important aspect of working conditions.
That this extreme view is not always appropriate and that trade unions continue to play an
important role also in advanced countries is visible from the discussion about work-life balance
and burn-out syndromes. Both discussions are - historically speaking - fairly new and the
respective role of individual characteristics of workers and work conditions is still to be seen.
It might be a good idea for unions to go and collect data on these issues.
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